| dc.description | INTRODUCTION & CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................ 1
1.2 Statement of Problem............................................................. 5
1.3 Literature Review.................................................................. 9
1.4 Objectives of Research........................................................... 26
1.5 Scope & Limitation .............................................................. 26
1.6 Hypotheses......................................................................... 26
1.7 Research Question................................................................ 27
1.8 Research Methodology........................................................... 27
1.9 Organization of Research......................................................... 29
1.10 Law on Competition in India: MRTP Law.................................... 30
1.10.1 Drawbacks of MRTP Act............................................. 35
1.10.2 Unclear Jurisdiction of MRTP Commission....................... 36
1.10.3 Judicial Opinion....................................................... 37
1.11 Evolution of Competition Act in India.......................................... 39
1.11.1 Anti-Competitive Agreements ...................................... 40
1.11.2 Abuse of Dominant Position......................................... 41
1.11.3 Regulations on Combinations....................................... 42
1.11.4 Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction........................................ 43
1.11.5 Penal Provisions, Remedies, Recoveries & Enforcement........ 43
1.12 Draft Competition Amendment Bill 2020..................................... 44
vii
1.13 Competition (Amendment) Act 2023 on leniency regime................... 53
1.13.1 Leniency Plus: As introduced in Competition (Amendment)
Act 2023................................................................
53
1.13.2 Link between leniency plus and penalty plus..................... 54
1.14 Conclusion......................................................................... 55
CHAPTER – 2
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CARTELS
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................ 56
2.1.1 Challenges in detecting Hardcore Cartels.......................... 58
2.2 Cartels in USA.................................................................... 60
2.2.1 Introduction............................................................ 60
2.2.2 The first trust........................................................... 60
2.2.3 The trust-busting President........................................... 62
2.2.4 Modern Trust........................................................... 62
2.3 Cartels in European Union (EU)................................................ 65
2.3.1 Introduction............................................................ 65
2.3.2 The Prohibition under Article 101(1)............................... 67
2.3.3 Enforcement of Article 101.......................................... 68
2.3.4 Unannounced inspection in Automotive Sector................... 69
2.4 Cartels in India..................................................................... 71
2.4.1 Introduction............................................................ 71
2.4.2 Imposition and Determination of Penalties........................ 72
2.4.3 Anti-Cartel enforcement in India.................................... 74
2.4.4 Presence of a Cartel: A clarification of evidence.................. 75
2.4.5 Cartel conducts......................................................... 77
viii
CHAPTER – 3
3. INDIAN LENIENCY MECHANISM: A ROADMAP TO
TRACK CARTELS
3.1 Introduction........................................................................ 82
3.2 The need of a leniency program................................................. 82
3.3 Status of leniency program in Indian Competition Law..................... 84
3.3.1 Leniency Program in India & its effects............................ 88
3.3.2 Present framework of leniency program..................... ... 89
3.4 Filing of a leniency application.................................................. 90
3.5 Requirements needed to be considered for leniency in India............... 92
3.5.1 When to make a filing................................................ 92
3.5.2 Marker Position........................................................ 93
3.5.3 Nature of Evidence.................................................... 93
3.6 Concern of Confidentiality of leniency application......................... 94
3.7 Conclusion......................................................................... 96
3.8 List of cases decided by Competition Commission of India till June
2022.................................................................................
98
CHAPTER – 4
4. LENIENCY MECHANISM IN DEVELOPED ANTITRUST
JURISDICTIONS
4.1 Leniency provision in USA...................................................... 100
4.1.1 Introduction............................................................ 100
4.1.2 Status of leniency in USA........................................... 102
4.1.3 Infringements covered under leniency program.................. 105
4.1.4 Recent updates on criminal leniency program by DOJ......... 105
4.2 Leniency program in European Union (EU)................................... 109
4.2.1 Introduction............................................................ 109
4.2.2 Administrative or Regulatory body................................. 110
ix
4.2.3 Status of leniency scheme in EU................................... 111
4.2.4 Provisions under 2006 leniency notice of EU.................... 111
4.2.5 Waivers of confidentiality........................................... 114
4.2.6 Conclusion.............................................................. 115
CHAPTER – 5
5. UNCERTAIN APPROACH OF CCI TO DECIDE
LENIENCY: ANALYSIS OF INDIAN DECISIONS
5.1 Introduction........................................................................ 117
5.2 Pattern followed by CCI while deciding leniency applications............. 118
5.3 In Re: Indian Railways for supply of Brushless DC Fans & other
electrical Items (Suo Moto Case No. 03 of 2014, order dated
18/01/2017)
119
5.3.1 Facts & Background.................................................. 119
5.3.2 Order and Analysis.................................................... 124
5.4 In Re: Cartelization in respect of zinc carbon dry cell batteries market in
India (Suo moto Case No. 02 of 2016 order dated 19/04/2018)
125
5.4.1 Facts..................................................................... 125
5.4.2 Order and Analysis.................................................... 126
5.5 Nagrik Chetna Manch v Fortified Security Solutions &Others (Case
No. 50 of 2015)
130
5.5.1 Facts..................................................................... 130
5.5.2 Investigation Report................................................... 131
5.5.3 Contention of parties before CCI................................... 132
5.5.4 Order by CCI.......................................................... 133
5.5.5 Analysis of the order.................................................. 136
5.6 Re: Cartelization by Broadcasting services providers (Suo Moto Case
02 of 2013 order dated 11/07/2018
137
5.6.1 Background............................................................ 137
5.6.2 Investigation by Director General................................... 137
5.6.3 Violation of Sec 3(3) of the Competition Act 2002............... 138
x
5.6.4 CCI’s order & Leniency.............................................. 138
5.6.5 Analysis................................................................. 139
5.7 In Re: Anticompetitive conduct in drycell batteries market in India (Suo
Moto Case No. 03 of 2017 order dated15/01/2019)
140
5.7.1 Facts..................................................................... 140
5.7.2 Contentions given by Godrej......................................... 141
5.7.3 Decision given by CCI................................................ 141
5.7.4 Analysis................................................................. 142
5.8 Alleged Cartelization in Flashlight market in India (Suo Moto Case No.
01 of 2017 order dated 06/11/2018)
144
5.8.1 Fact...................................................................... 144
5.8.2 Report of Director General........................................... 145
5.8.3 Commission’s analysis and order.................................... 146
5.9 In Re : Cartelization in the supply of Electric Power Steering System
(EPS) system (Suo Moto Case No. 07(01) of 2014 order dated
09/08/2019
148
5.9.1 Background............................................................. 148
5.9.2 Findings of Director General......................................... 149
5.9.3 Order and Analysis.................................................... 149
5.10 In Re : Alleged anti-competitive conduct in the Beer market in India
(Suo Moto Case No. 06 of 2017 order dated 24/09/2021) 152
5.10.1 Background and Facts of the case................................... 152
5.10.2 Observation of CCI................................................... 152
5.10.3 Effects of unfair business practices................................. 153
5.10.4 Imposition of penalty................................................. 153
5.11 In Re : Cartelization by shipping lines in the matter of provision of
Maritime Motor Vehicle Transport Services to the original equipment
manufacturers (Suo Moto Case No. 10 of 2014 order dated 20/01/2022)
155
5.11.1 Facts..................................................................... 155
5.11.2 Allegations.............................................................. 155
5.11.3 Contentions by parties................................................ 156
5.11.4 Observations and decisions by CCI................................. 158
xi
5.12 In Re : Cartelization in supply of protective tubes to Indian Railways
(Suo Moto Case No. 06 of 2020 order dated 09/06/2022).................. 160
5.12.1 Background............................................................. 160
5.12.2 Prima facie view....................................................... 160
5.12.3 Findings of Director General......................................... 160
5.12.4 CCI’s findings and Decision.......................................... 161
CHAPTER – 6
6. CONCLUSION & SUGGESTIONS
6.1 Conclusion......................................................................... 163
6.1.1 General Remarks...................................................... 163
6.1.2 Specific Remarks...................................................... 167
6.1.3 Hypotheses testing..................................................... 176
6.2 Suggestions........................................................................ 180
BIBLIGRAPHY ............................................................
183
Annexure - 1
COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (LESSER PENALTY)
REGULATIONS, 2009, NO. 4 OF 2009, (AUG. 13, 2009)
190-196
Annexure - II
THE COMPETITION (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2023 SALIENT FEATURES
197-208
Annexure - III
BEST PRACTICES FOR THE FORMAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
BETWEEN COMPETITION AUTHORITIES IN HARD CORE CARTEL
INVESTIGATION OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, October 2005 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | Cartel leniency is a term used to describe a clause in competition law that permits members
of cartels—illegal agreements between rivals to control prices or restrict competition—to
obtain lighter punishments or immunity in exchange for helping the authorities with their
investigation.
A cartel member might contact the CCI under the Indian programme for leniency and
disclose crucial details about the cartel, including supporting documentation, in exchange
for lenient treatment. The manner in which the cartel member contacts the CCI and the
importance of the information provided will determine the degree of leniency.
A cartel member might contact the CCI under the Indian programme for leniency and
disclose crucial details about the cartel, including supporting documentation, in exchange
for lenient treatment. The manner in which the cartel member contacts the CCI and the
importance of the information provided will determine the degree of leniency.
The first participant to contact the CCI and disclose material information may be granted
full immunity, which means they won't be subject to any fines or penalties. Depending on
the time and level of their cooperation, the subsequent participants may be eligible for a
reduction in fines of up to 50%.
The cartel member must offer all pertinent data and proof required for the CCI to prove
the existence of the cartel in order to be qualified for leniency. They must also keep all
information completely secret and provide full cooperation during the investigation.
By offering rewards to cartel members who reveal illicit deals, the leniency programme
hopes to foster a culture of compliance and deterrence. It supports healthy competition in
the Indian market by identifying and punishing anti-competitive behaviour.
The goal of India's leniency programme is to identify and break up cartels that hurt
consumers and the free market. It intends to make the discovery and prosecution of anti-
competitive practices easier by providing incentives for cartel participants to come
forward.
The programme aims to reward anyone who work with the police to uncover such practice
s, acknowledging that cartel members may have been forced or persuaded to take part in
iv
illegal agreements. The programme promotes self-reporting and deters further
involvement in cartels by offering leniency.
A cartel member must approach the CCI voluntarily and offer substantial evidence that
can help establish the existence of the cartel in order to qualify for leniency. For the CCI's
investigation and future enforcement measures, this evidence should be essential.
Additionally, the applicant for leniency must consent to total confidentiality with regard
to their collaboration with the CCI. Because of this confidentiality, other cartel members
won't be made aware of the investigation, enabling the government to collect more
evidence and implement strong enforcement measures.
The "marker" technique used by the leniency programme gives preferential consideration
to the first cartel member to contact the CCI. If they meet all requirements and offer crucial
information that aids in the establishment of the cartel, they can be given full immunity
from fines and penalties.
It is crucial to remember that the leniency programme does not ensure total immunity or
protection from legal repercussions. The applicant must continue to cooperate and adhere
to the program's rules in order for the leniency to be granted.
The leniency programme is an effective weapon in the battle against cartels because it
provides incentives for members to come forward and admit their involvement. By
guaranteeing lower pricing, more options, and innovation in the market, it ultimately helps
consumers and improves the CCI's capacity to identify and prosecute anti-competitive
practices. | en_US |
